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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The nature of computing has changed significantly in the last decade. The
introduction of popular mobile devices such as Apple’s iPhone and Google’s Android
smartphones has allowed consumers constant, ubiquitous access to local applications and
Internet resources. A Pew Research survey from June 2013 found that 56% of American
adults own a smartphone [1]. This represents an increase from 46% U.S. adult
smartphone ownership in February of 2012 and 35% in May of 2011. The majority of
smartphones in the survey ran Apple’s iOS operating system or Google’s Android
operating system. In a separate survey from the same month, Pew found that 34% of
American adults own a tablet [2]. This showed an increase from 18% in February of
2012 and 8% in May of 2011.
Not only are we carrying computing devices in our pockets and our purses, but we
are allowing them into novel roles in our homes, cars, and workplaces. Digital
computing capabilities are being added to non-traditional devices such as home
electronics, medical devices, and building infrastructure. Toys, refrigerators, thermostats,
heart rate monitors, door locks, and external lights may be equipped with imbedded

1

processors allowing for remote monitoring and communications. Many such devices are
controlled by personal mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets, through wireless
communications technologies. Many are also accessible through external Internet servers
[3].
Bluetooth devices are being used in retail and tourism locations for value-added
features and marketing. Macy’s and Apple are two retailers exploring the use of such
devices in their brick and mortar locations [4]. Generally, the intent of such devices is to
communicate with personal mobile devices being utilized by in-store customers. The
retailer may offer discounts, track shopper browsing patterns, or suggest companion
purchases.
These ubiquitous computing devices are now built into cars, home controls,
appliances and are located in public, industrial, and commercial spaces. The term for
these new ways of managing and monitoring products and equipment is the Internet of
Things. As with the traditional Internet, communication is critical. Wired networks are
impractical in many of these scenarios, so the obvious choice is to implement wireless
communications. As of the writing of this thesis, vendors seem to be coalescing around
three wireless communications technologies: cellular, Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi [5].
This increase in access to wireless devices has not seen a corresponding increase
in end user security practices or a decrease in attempts to compromise these devices for
malicious intent. A recent Consumer Reports survey found that 40% of respondents did
not take any recommended minimal security precautions on smartphones [6].

2

In 2012, 5.6 million smartphone users suffered the negative effects of malware.
This constitutes 5% of total smartphone users [6]. In the last week of 2013 and first week
of 2014, Proofpoint, a security firm, located 100,000 routers, multimedia centers, smart
TVs, and one smart refrigerator being utilized as hosts for a botnet scheme sending over
750,000 spam emails [7].
The current and planned increase in the number and variety of ubiquitous
computing devices makes end user and vendor security efforts ever more critical. Often,
the desire for convenience overrides the need for security, leaving end users open to
malicious attacks.
It is our belief that user education is the most effective element of sound security
practices. Whether the system is a consumer product or an enterprise solution, all
security mitigation efforts require a certain level of cooperation from the users of the
system. Often this cooperation is enlisted through security policy enforcement and
passive communications to the user. They are told what to do and what to fear. These
methods are relatively successful [8, 9, 10].
In 15 years as an information technology trainer, technology consultant, and
technology director in a number of business and education environments, I find that true
user education is far more effective than passive communications. End users are much
more willing to implement best practices and are more aware of new threats when they
are taught why an attack is a threat and how the technology works. Even basic levels of
understanding empower users to be active participants in prevention and mitigation
efforts.
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Our research efforts were centralized around that concept. We offer the
proposition that direct user education on practical, real world security risks may affect
user attitudes towards security practices when using ubiquitous consumer computing
devices. For the purposes of this experiment, we focused that user education around two
popular types of wireless communications, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi services on mobile
devices.
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide technical
background on Bluetooth and Wi-Fi, two prominent wireless technologies utilized by
pervasive computing devices and the primary focus of the user education portion of our
experiment. In Chapters 3 and 4, we offer a more in-depth description of Bluetooth
security, attacks, and mitigation actions. Chapter 5 presents the design of our
experiment. In Chapter 6, we discuss the results and key findings of our experiment.
Finally, Chapter 7 presents conclusions and future work.
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CHAPTER 2
OVERVIEW OF BLUETOOTH AND WI-FI
COMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS

The vast majority, if not all, personal mobile devices utilize wireless
communications to access the Internet, peripheral devices, and other mobile devices.
Bluetooth and Wi-Fi services are two of the most popular wireless services. As such,
they are a common attack vector exploited for malicious intent. Our user education
projects focused on these two technologies. As background and to illustrate the topics we
presented to our study participants, the following section provides an overview of
Bluetooth and Wi-Fi communications standards.
2.1 Bluetooth
Bluetooth is a wireless technology which supports both voice and data transfer.
Designed to be low-cost and user-friendly, Bluetooth utilizes radio frequencies to create
ad hoc networks of diverse devices to allow functions like file sharing, wireless
synchronization, and peripheral device access.
The Bluetooth standard is governed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group
(www.bluetooth.org), which defines and publishes specifications and requirements. The
5

Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) was formed in 1998 by Ericsson, IBM, Intel,
Nokia, and Toshiba in order to standardize Bluetooth technology across the industry.
Vendors must adhere to the specifications and maintain membership in the Special
Interest Group in order to advertise a technology as Bluetooth compliant. The following
subsections are a summary of the contents of the most recent specification [12].
2.2 Bluetooth Specification Versions
Over the last decade, Bluetooth SIG has published four versions of the
specifications. Introduced in 2002, version 1.2 of the specification supports Basic Rate
(BR) transmissions with speeds up to 1 Mbps. Version 2.0, adopted in 2004, introduced
Enhanced Data, which allows for speeds of up to 3 Mbps. Support for High Speed (HS)
was adopted in version 3.0, which was released in 2008. Bluetooth version 3.0+HS
supports speeds up to 24 Mbps. In 2010, the Bluetooth SIG adopted the most recent
update of its Core Specification, version 4.0. Each subsequent specification version
includes backwards compatibility support for previous versions of the specifications.
Version 4.0 is essentially two specifications in one. The first side of version 4.0
supports the classic Bluetooth architecture, BR/EDR Bluetooth. The second side
introduces support for Low Energy (LE) devices. LE significantly changes the Bluetooth
architecture, reducing complexity, power consumption, and cost in order to support
devices that might run on coin-size batteries for long periods of time. Both LE and
BR/EDR specifications include mechanisms for device discovery, connection
establishment, and connection management. Bluetooth 4.0 devices may only support LE
or BR/EDR or might have dual support for the classic architecture, as well as LE
communication. The description in this chapter is based on Version 4.0.
6

2.3 Classes
Bluetooth devices are categorized into three power classes based on the signal
strength of transceiver and maximum power consumption. Although each class
describes the maximum range of the device’s radio, the effective range may be less given
external and environmental conditions. Table 2.1 illustrates the three classes and their
characteristics.

Table 2.1: Bluetooth Device Classes
Device Class

Maximum Range

Class 1

100 meters

Maximum Power
Consumption
100 megawatts

Class 2

10 meters

2. 5 megawatts

Class 3

1 meter

1 megawatt

Description
Industrial uses, access
points
Mobile devices, most
common
Uncommon,
specialized use

2.4 Frequency hopping
Both BR/EDR and LE Bluetooth devices utilize the Industrial, Scientific, and
Medical (ISM) band for their communication bandwidth. The ISM band covers the
frequencies between 2.4 GHz and 2.485 GHz and is available for use without a license.
Bluetooth devices transfer data across multiple frequencies within this range by hopping
across the spectrums in specific intervals. This frequency hopping scheme provides some
security, but more importantly it allows for detection and avoidance of occupied
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frequencies. If an interfering device is encountered on a frequency within the pattern, the
hopping pattern will be modified to exclude the occupied frequency.
BR/EDR Bluetooth devices employ a frequency hopping scheme, which hops
across 79 frequencies at 1 MHz intervals. Data is broken down into packets and
transferred across the physical channel in slots, which are time-divisions of the channel.
Frequency hopping occurs between slots. This Time-Division Duplex (TDD) scheme
allows for full duplex communication across the physical channel.
LE Bluetooth devices have two access schemes available to utilize the physical
channel. Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) divides the ISM bandwidth into
40 channels in 2 MHz intervals. Three channels are reserved for advertising services.
The remaining 37 channels are available for data transfer. With Time Division Multiple
Access (TDMA), a device sends a data packet at a pre-determined time and the receiving
device responds after a predetermined interval. Like BR/EDR, LE communication
divides the physical channel by time, but refers to these units as events. Packets are
transmitted during these events, which are classified as either advertising or connection
events.
Advertisers use advertising events to send advertising packets indicating that they
are available for connections. Advertisers may also use these events to communicate
unidirectional or broadcast messages across the physical link. An initiator intending to
connect to an advertiser listens for a connectable advertising packet and sends a
connection request to the available advertiser. The advertiser may accept the request and
establish the connection to the requestor in order to transfer data between the two
devices.
8

2.5 Piconets, Masters, and Slaves
Two or more Bluetooth devices that are in close physical proximity may form a
piconet. Once devices join a piconet, they communicate using a common frequency
hopping scheme. One device serves as the master device and others are slave devices.
The master device is responsible for providing the synchronization reference to one or
more slave devices within that piconet. With LE devices, the master device is the
initiator of the first connection in the piconet. The advertiser of that first connection
becomes the first slave. The piconet master determines the frequency hopping pattern for
the entire piconet based on its own Bluetooth address and clock. Communication links
are created between a master and slave, but never directly between two slave devices.
Piconets comprised of BR/EDR devices may have one master and up to 7 active
slave devices and 255 inactive devices. LE devices have no limit on the number of slave
devices within a piconet. A slave may only form a connection with one master in a given
piconet. Role switching between master and slave is not supported. However, utilizing
time division multiplexing, a slave in one piconet may be a slave or even a master in a
second piconet. This creates a scatternet and allows for greater ranges and more dynamic
topologies.
2.6 Core System Architecture
The Bluetooth 4.0 Specification defines two logical stacks whose responsibilities
are common across all Bluetooth profiles. These stacks are standardized to allow for
communication across heterogeneous devices, such as a cell phone to an earphone or a
laptop to a printer. Each Bluetooth implementation consists of one Host stack and one or
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more Controller stacks with a Host Controller Interface (HCI) acting as the interface
between the stacks. Bluetooth messages are broken up into packets and passed from the
bottom or physical (PHY) layers, which represent the communication medium, on
through the Controller, the HCI, and the Host and then passed to the service-specific
profiles. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationships between Host, Controllers, services, and
protocols with the core specification.

Host
SMP

ATT/GATT

AMP
Manager

SDP

Channel Manager

L2CAP

L2CAP Resource
Manager

Host Controller Interface

BR/EDR Controller
Link
Manager
Device
Manager

LE Controller
Link
Manager

Baseband Resource Manager
Link
Controller

AMP
Controller
AMP PAL

AMP MAC

Link
Controller

AMP PHY
BR/EDR Radio and LE Radio

Figure 2.1: Bluetooth Stacks and Protocols
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2.7 Host Stack Functions and Protocols
The Host stack includes higher level protocols and links, such as logical transport,
logical link, Logical Link Control and Adaption Protocol (L2CAP), and Service
Discovery Protocol (SDP), and resides below the non-core profiles and above the HCI.
Logical links support unicast synchronous, asynchronous, and isochronous
communication, as well as broadcast traffic. A single physical link may carry
communication for one or more logical links.
Bluetooth devices utilize SDP to identify services available for consumption on
other devices. A device in Discoverable Mode advertises services that it hosts, as well as
the connection and security details for those services. A discoverable device monitors for
inquiries and scans the physical channel for SDP messages from other devices. The
discoverable device will respond to queries with the device address, the local clock value,
and additional information needed to page and then connect to its services. After the
connection is established, Discoverable Mode is no longer required and, to increase
security, can be turned off.
Both BR/EDR and LE devices utilize L2CAP during communication. L2CAP
abstracts the logical and physical channels for higher level applications and services. It
also segments data into packets on the sending device and reassembles the packets on the
receiving devices. In addition, L2CAP manages multiplexing functions to allow for a
shared logical link. LE devices also utilize L2CAP channels to transport Security
Manager Protocol (SMP) messages to secure communication between two devices and
Attribute protocol (ATT) messages to communicate attribute and service details.
BR/EDR devices may also utilize ATT.
11

The channel manager, located in the Host stack, is responsible for creating,
managing, and closing L2CAP channels between communicating devices. It may also
interact with the link manager to create and manage logical links between communicating
devices. The L2CAP resource manager is responsible for managing scheduling and
traffic shaping for any QoS requirements during communication.
2.8 Controller Stack Functions and Protocols
The Bluetooth Specification defines two types of Controllers: Primary and
Secondary. A Bluetooth device has one Primary Controller, which may include physical
and link management for BR/EDR or LE capabilities or a combination of the two. In a
BR/EDR device, the Primary Controller would, at a minimum, consist of the radio,
baseband, and Link Manager. In an LE device, the Primary Controller includes the LE
PHY and link layer. Both BR/EDR and LE Primary Controllers may optionally include
the HCI. A device that supports both BR/EDR and LE profiles would include a Primary
Controller with a combination of the above features.
Link management is the responsibility of the Link Manager, which is located in
the Primary Controller. For BR/EDR devices, the Link Manager utilizes a control
protocol, called Link Manager Protocol (LMP), to manage the baseband and physical
layers. LMP protocol traffic is carried over the logical links, along with data traffic. By
default, all devices within a piconet use asynchronous connection-oriented logical (ACL)
transport to transport LMP traffic. With LE devices, the equivalent to LMP is the Link
Layer (LL) protocol. As with BR/EDR, LL is transported by default using an LE version
of ACL.

12

Basic non-data transfer operations are the responsibility of the device manager.
This includes establishing connections, enabling and disabling Discoverable and
Connectable Modes, and storing information such as a device name and link keys. The
device manager interacts directly with the baseband resource manager, which provides
access to the Bluetooth radio, to complete these tasks. Both the device manager and the
baseband resource manager reside within the Primary Controller.
The device may also include one or more Secondary Controllers to manage
Alternate MAC/PHY (AMP) communications. AMP allows BR/EDR devices to increase
data transfer speeds to a theoretical maximum of 24 Mbps. Devices that can utilize AMP
are referred to as High Speed (+HS). This controller would include an 802.11 Protocol
Adaptation Layer (PAL) and 802.11 MAC and PHY. Similar to the Primary Controller,
the Secondary Controller may optionally include the HCI.
Devices utilizing AMP establish communication using the Primary Controller.
The AMP manager, which resides in the Host stack, is responsible for using L2CAP to
communicate with remote devices to determine their AMP capabilities. If both devices
are capable of AMP, communication is moved from to the Secondary Controller. If
there is a need to reduce power consumption, communication may be swapped back to
the Primary controller and return to using lower speeds. L2CAP channels may be created
on the Secondary Controller or moved to the Secondary Controller after being created on
the Primary Controller.
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2.9 Wi-Fi
The standards and definitions for Wi-Fi communications are formalized in the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 specifications. Originally
released in 1997, the specification has gone through multiple amendments and updates.
Each amendment to the specification is denoted by a letter or letters following the
specification name, e.g. 802.11ac [13]. The following overview is based on the most
recent published specifications [14]. Table 2.2 summarizes key 802.11 amendments and
their characteristics.

Table 2.2: Key 802. 11 Amendments
Specification
802. 11-1997
802. 11a
802. 11b
802. 11e
802. 11p
802. 11g
802. 11i
802. 11n
802. 11ac
802. 11ad

Publish Date
1997
1999
1999
2000
2003
2003
2004
2009
2012
2012

Key Characteristics
Original spec, 2 Mbps
54 Mbps, 5 GHz
11 Mbps, 2. 4 GHz
Support for Quality of Service (QoS)
Optimized for motor vehicles
54 Mbps, 2. 4 GHz
Support for WPA & WPA2
600 Mbps, 2. 4 & 5 GHz
>1 Gbps, <6 GHz
>1 Gbps, 60 GHz

The 802.11 standard addresses a single medium access control (MAC) and
multiple physical layer (PHY) specifications. The standard is intended to be used by
wireless hosts or stations (STAs) in a limited geographic area, also known as a wireless
local area network (WLAN). Examples of STAs include Wi-Fi enabled tablets, laptops,
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or smart TVs. The PHYs are implemented via radio over the 2.4, 3.6, 5 and 60 GHz
frequency bands. An additional PHY utilizes Infrared (IR) communications.
The core unit of an 802.11 WLAN is the basic service set (BSS). The BSS
represents a grouping of communicating STAs whose membership in a particular BSS is
dynamic. A BSS may be ad hoc and decentralized in nature, in which case it is referred
to as an independent BSS (IBSS). An IBSS could be as simple as two STAs directly
communicating with one another. A BSS may be also an infrastructure BSS, meaning
that management of the network is centralized on one or more infrastructure devices,
such as a WLAN controller.
The nature of the wireless PHYs utilized by 802.11 imposes geographical limits
on the range of any individual BSS. The standard overcomes these limitations using
distribution systems (DS). The DS represents an extension of the BSS. An STA that acts
as an entry point for other STA devices to a DS is called an access point (AP). The
Service Set Identification (SSID) advertises the wireless network to STAs wishing to
connect to a given BSS [15].
The wireless media of 802.11 communications makes management of media
access critical. Interference and collisions are common and must be managed. The
802.11 MAC provides two options for media access. Distributed Coordination Function
(DCF) is required of all 802.11 STAs. DCF utilizes Carrier Sense Multiple Access with
Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA). Point Coordination Function (PCF) is an optional
mechanism and provides controlled access via polling by the AP [13].
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Each STA is responsible for its own media access in CSMA/CA. When a device
has data to send, it listens to the media and if the media is free for a pre-determined time,
called the DCF Inter-Frame Space (DIFS), the device sends its message. The destination
STA sends an acknowledgement when the message is successfully received. If the
sending STA does not receive the acknowledgement, it will resend the message following
the same rules [13].
Collisions are still possible using this method. If a collision occurs, the two
problem STAs will select a random time to wait prior to resending the message. This
Collision Avoidance (CA) decreases the likelihood that the two devices will attempt to
resend after the same period and experience another collision [13].
2.10 Wi-Fi Security
The specification addresses efforts to secure wireless communications using
encryption, authentication, and authorization techniques. Several of the security
mechanisms described in the standard are deprecated and should only be used for
backwards compatibility. In addition to the options defined by the 802.11 standard,
software and hardware vendors may include their own security measures.
The original security option defined in 802.11 was Wireless Equivalent Protocol
(WEP). WEP protects data by encrypting it at the link level using either a 40-bit or 104bit key. WEP does not include any mechanisms for authentication.
Shared Key or Open System authentication may be used in combination with
WEP. Open System allows any STA to connect to the SSID, however the STA must
have the WEP keys in order to communicate on the network. Shared Key involves a
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challenge-response procedure whereby the AP sends a clear-text message to the
connecting STA. The STA encrypts the message using the common WEP key and
returns the encrypted data back to the AP. If the message decrypts successfully, the AP
accepts the connection request. Although neither method is secure, Shared Key is more
vulnerable to exploit, as the message exchange can be intercepted and the WEP key
extrapolated from the exchange. IEEE has deprecated WEP and Shared Key
authentication.
In 2004, IEEE introduced 802.11i which included support for Wi-Fi Protected
Access (WPA). WPA was designed to address the weaknesses of WEP and supersede
the older protocol. The 802.11i amendment defined three components of WPA:
Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP), Message Integrity Code (MIC), and 802.1x.
One improvement over WEP is the inclusion of authentication via 802.1x. Using
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), an STA sends credentials in the form of a user
name and password combination or digital certificate to the AP. The AP confirms the
credentials against an authentication server and allows access upon successful
confirmation [15].
The encryption capabilities of WEP are replaced by TKIP. In addition to
improved 128-bit keys, TKIP encrypts each packet with its own key. This limits
vulnerability to key interception and increases the confidence in message confidentiality.
TKIP is combined with MIC, a keyed hashing function which ensures message integrity.
The total is an improvement over the basic security provided by WEP [15].
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Although WPA corrected many of the issues associated with WEP, it has
vulnerabilities of its own. In 2006, WPA2 was published and now supersedes WPA.
One improvement in the new specification was the mandatory use of Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) for packet encryption. Counter Cipher Mode with Block
Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol (CCMP) replace TKIP for data
encryption. CCMP uses AES and a 128-bit key and block cipher to provide both data
confidentiality and integrity [15].
Both WPA and WPA2 suffer from a common weakness in the form of Wi-Fi
Protected Setup (WPS). This service was intended to provide easy, push button secure
setup of consumer APs. WPS is not part of the IEEE 802.11 standard, but many wireless
routers and modems provide the service. With enough computing power and time, WPS
devices can be compromised. From there attackers may access the WPA/WPA2
preshared keys [15]. End users are highly recommended to disable WPS on any wireless
devices.
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CHAPTER 3
BLUETOOTH SECURITY

Bluetooth is designed to be a peer-to-peer technology, with no centralized control
over mechanisms such as security. As such, each device is responsible for managing and
maintaining its own security. Devices differ in their security capabilities based on the
supported Bluetooth version and hardware or software design. Nevertheless, the
Bluetooth specification does provide a certain level of commonality between Bluetooth
devices. The specification directly addresses both authentication and confidentiality. It
also allows for authorization to be managed at the service level. The specification does
not address other security services, such as auditing or non-repudiation. However, these
services may be addressed at the application level. The following section is a summary of
the contents of the most recent specification concerning security [12].
3.1 Discovery and Pairing
Discoverable mode enables a Bluetooth device to advertise itself and its services
to other Bluetooth devices. Devices in discoverable mode respond to inquiries with
connection details, including security requirements. This provides a basic level of
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security by “hiding” devices when discoverable mode is disabled. In order to connect to
a non-discoverable device, the device’s unique 48 bit Bluetooth address must be known.
In most instances, before data can be exchanged between devices, the
communicating devices must pair with one another. The main goal of pairing is to
establish and define trusted devices. During the pairing process, the devices establish a
shared secret, which may be used to assure confidentiality of data, as well as authenticate
the connection. The details of the pairing process differ between Bluetooth versions.
3.2 BR/EDR Security Features
Bluetooth devices with BR/EDR capabilities have four possible security modes
that describe device security capabilities and requirements. The security mode is
determined by the device manufacturer based on the intended use of the device. Table
3.1 outlines these four modes.

Table 3.1: BR/EDR Security Modes
Security Mode
Security Mode 1

Options
Not secure
Authentication and Encryption are not initialized

Security Mode 2

Enforced at service level
Discovery does not require security
Authentication, Encryption, and Authorization are required for any
connection to the device
Service-level authorization not required
Enforced at service level
 Authenticated link key required
 Unauthenticated link key required
 No security key required
Security initiated after physical and logical links are established

Security Mode 3

Security Mode 4
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Basic security for BR/EDR is handled at the link layer in the Primary Controller.
The link layer utilizes four entities for security: the Bluetooth device address, two private
user keys, and a pseudo-random number.
The Bluetooth device address or BD_ADDR is a unique 48-bit value. The
BD_ADDR is openly accessible by other Bluetooth devices via user/application inquires
or automatic device queries, such as a discovery request.
One private user key is utilized for authentication purposes and is fixed at 128
bits. This key is referred to as the link key and is kept secret between the paired devices.
The lifetime of the link key is determined by the application using the connection. The
second private key is used for encryption. The length of this key is variable and may be
from 8 to 128 bits in length. This flexibility allows BR/EDR to meet the encryption
requirements of different countries, as well as simplifying any upgrades to security
capabilities. Key size should be set by vendor and not modifiable by user or application.
The encryption key is generated from the link key and is recreated each time encryption
is activated.
The pseudo-random number is 128 bits in length. It is generated by the FIPS
compliant pseudo-random number generator located on all Bluetooth devices. It is
regenerated for each new transaction.
The BR/EDR Primary Controller is responsible for the management of both link
keys and encryption keys. This includes determining the expiration of a key. Link keys
are either semi-permanent, which can be used for more than one connection between the
same new devices or temporary, which are valid for current session only.
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3.3 Link Key Types
BR/EDR allows for the use of four types of link keys: the combination key (KAB),
the unit key (KA), the temporary key (Kmaster), and the initialization key (Kinit). A
combination key is generated for each different link and allows for a higher degree of
security, but also requires more memory than the simpler unit key. The combination key
is built using random numbers and BD_ADDR from both devices and results in a 128-bit
link key. The random numbers are exchanged between the connecting devices by
XORing them with the connection’s initial link key. This process keeps the combination
key secure. Once the combination key is generated, mutual authentication confirms the
process was successful on both devices. If mutual authentication is successful the initial
link key is discarded and the new combination key is used for the connection.
The unit key is deprecated due to its insecure nature. It is generally used by
devices with limited memory or with multiple users. The unit key is created when a
device is first used, not during individual pairings, and as such, remains relatively static.
If memory is an issue, the device with the memory limitation will send its unit key during
the initialization process to the device without a memory limitation. This means that the
memory-limited device only has to store its own key.
The temporary key has a short lifetime and is only used for current sessions. The
temporary key is commonly used when a master broadcasts data to multiple slaves. In
addition to the temporary key, the master device would also send a random number,
EN_RAND, to be used by slaves to generate encryption keys.
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The initialization key is used during initialization prior to the creation of the
longer term link keys. The key allows for the secure transfer of initialization parameters
before a common link key exists between the communicating devices. The initialization
key is created using the PIN, a random number (IN_RAND), and the BD_ADDR of the
device. To increase security, the key must be built with a PIN from a device that
supports PINs of variable length. If neither device allows for PIN length variability, then
devices cannot pair. Key generation uses the BD_ADDR of the device from which the
PIN is selected. Since the security of the initialization key depends on the security of the
PIN, the application is responsible for protecting the device from a brute force attack
against the PIN.
A final type of key that might be managed by the Controller is the encryption key
(KC). This key is used when data transfers are protected through encryption. The
encryption key is generated using the current link key, a 96-bit Ciphering Offset number
(COF), and a 128-bit random number. The COF is either the piconet master device’s
BD_ADDR, if the link key is a master link key, or the Authenticated Ciphering Offset
(ACO) which is generated after successful authentication and stored on both devices.
All five key types are generated during the initialization process, which
establishes trust relationships, link keys, and encryption keys. After the initialization
process establishes the pairing or trust between two devices, subsequent connections
between those devices use the same link key, but generate new encryption keys. The
initialization process is broken into five stages. The first four are required and the final
stage is optional, depending on the requirements of the connection. Figure 3.1 illustrates
the five stages.
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Figure 3.1: Connection Initialization Stages

3.4 Authentication
Bluetooth BR/EDR devices support two authentication processes. The first, also
known as legacy pairing, is available in all Bluetooth specification versions. The
alternative, Secure Simple Pairing, was adopted in Bluetooth Version 2. 1.
Legacy pairing uses a challenge/response scheme with one device assuming the
role of verifier and the other acting as the role of claimant. The verifier sends random
data (AU_RAND) as a challenge to the claimant. The claimant then uses its BD_ADDR
and the connection’s link key to encrypt the data. Thirty-two bits of the 128 bits of
encrypted data, known as the Signed Response (SRES), are sent back to the verifier, who
confirms the accuracy of the data. The remaining 96 bits of the response are used to
generate the encryption key for the connection. This process may be one-way, where
only one device is confirmed, or two-way, where both devices play each role. With
mutual authentication, when one device is successfully authenticated, the roles swap and
the process occurs again. If authentication fails, a waiting period is required before the
process can be reattempted. The wait increases exponentially after each subsequent
failure in order to protect the connection from brute force attacks. Figure 3.2 illustrates
the legacy pairing process.
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Figure 3.2: Legacy Paring Process

The newer alternative to the legacy pairing process, Secure Simple Pairing (SSP),
was designed to be a compromise between two somewhat opposing goals. The first goal
is to improve on the user’s experience by simplifying the authentication process. The
second goal is to maximize security by improving on the effectiveness of the legacy
pairing authentication process, which uses a PIN whose length may be between 1 and 16
digits. Unlike the legacy process, SSP does not use the PIN as input for encryption key
and generally requires a minimum PIN length of 6 digits. Devices that are required to
maintain compliance with Version 2.0 or earlier may support four digit PINs or a fixed
PIN, in addition to the SSP authentication methods.
Secure Simple Pairing provides four association models: Numeric Comparison,
Just Works, Out of Band (OOB), and Passkey Entry. The input/output capabilities and
security needs of the pairing devices determines the association model selection. Table
3.2 describes the four options.
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Table 3.2: Secure Simple Pairing Association Models
Association
Model
Numeric
Comparison

Device I/O
Capabilities
Both devices are
capable of display and
Yes/No input

Description

Out of Band

External means of
communicating, other
than Bluetooth radio,
e. g. Near Field
Communication

Passkey Entry

One device has input,
but not output, the
other has at least
output

Typically OOB is used for both discovery and
cryptographic info used in pairing
Security of OOB process is independent of
Bluetooth, device dependent
If one device is read only, one-way
authentication occurs, if both are read/write, twoway authentication is possible
6-digit PIN is display on one device and user is
prompted to enter it on the other device to
confirm pairing

Just Works

Both devices display a 6-digit PIN
User enters Yes/No based on match
PIN is not an input into the security algorithm
Intercepting the PIN cannot be used to
compromise encryption, unlike legacy pairing
One device does not
User may just be prompted to accept connection
have input or output,
attempt
second device has both Specifics are up to manufacturer
Protects against passive eavesdropping, not
MITM

Specifically, SSP aims to protect from passive eavesdropping and man-in-themiddle attacks. Passive eavesdropping attacks attempt to “listen” to data exchanges
between two devices without interfering with the exchange. SSP uses Elliptic Curve
Diffie Hellman (ECDH) public key cryptography to protect against passive
eavesdropping by encrypting the link key exchanged between the paired devices. The
specification utilizes ECDH over Diffie Hellman because of its computational simplicity.
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ECDH can be implemented by a greater number of Bluetooth devices with a larger
variety of memory and processing capabilities [16].
Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks may take place during the pairing process.
The attacking device intercepts communications between the legitimate paired devices
and may simply listen to data exchange or may modify the data en route. In either case,
the MITM attacker forwards the intercepted data to the intended recipient. Unlike a
passive eavesdropping attack, the absence of the attacking MITM device will interrupt
communication between the devices; thereby indicating an attack has occurred. SSP
protects against MITM in both Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry by using 6-digit
PINs for both association models. The longer PINs create a 1 in 1 million chance that an
attacker would successfully guess the correct combination of digits. The 6-digit
minimum length meets FIPS compliance, where the legacy paring’s 4 digit PIN does not
[16, 17].
The Secure Simple Pairing process consists of three phases. In Phase 1, the
public key exchange occurs between the pairing devices. Each device has an ECDH
public/private key pair. The public key is sent to the corresponding device, while the
private key is kept secret. Phase 2 is the first stage of authentication. The details of
phase 2 differ based on the association model being used, but essentially a user must
respond to a pairing request in some way. With Numeric Comparison and Just Works,
the user responds with OK on both devices if 6 digit display matches on both devices. If
the model is OOB, the devices exchange random data for comparison using public keys.
And finally, if the pairing uses Passkey Entry, the user enters the passkey on one or both
devices based on I/O capabilities of devices. Phase 3 is the second stage of
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authentication which confirms that both devices have successfully received the opposite
public key and confirms successful pairing. At the conclusion of the pairing process, the
link key is calculated using public keys and BD_ADDR from both devices.
3.5 Confidentiality
As with other types of network communication, Bluetooth ensures the
confidentiality of data transferred across its medium by encrypting the contents of
packets. Encryption is optional and only affects the packet payload. Packet access codes
and headers cannot be encrypted.
There are four possible confidentiality modes through which an application can
specify encryption requirements. Mode 1 specifies that no encryption is required on any
type of traffic. Mode 2 requires that unicast traffic is encrypted, but specifies that
broadcast traffic is not encrypted. Mode 3 requires that both unicast and broadcast traffic
are encrypted using a key built from master link key. And finally, Mode 4 specifies that
encryption is required for all data, except service discovery traffic.
BR/EDR defines three steps in the stream cipher system to complete the
encryption process. The first step uses the encryption key, the BD_ADDR, a clock value
and a random value to generate the payload key. The size, and therefore the strength, of
the encryption key are determined by a negotiation between the communicating devices
based on their capabilities and the minimum size established by the application. Step 2
takes the payload key as its input to generate the key stream bits. Finally, step 3 uses the
key stream to encrypt or decrypt the data. Figure 3.3 illustrates this process.
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Figure 3.3: Stream Cipher System

3.6 AMP Security Features
Bluetooth devices which are High Speed (HS) capable will include a Secondary
Controller to manage Alternate MAC/PHY (AMP) communications. As the majority of
security functions are managed by the Primary Controller, the AMP Controller provides
certain security functions for HS communication.
The AMP Controller uses SSP as its pairing mechanism. AMP radios are paired
at the same time as BR/EDR, so there is no perceivable difference for the end user. AMP
pairing can result in two possible link keys. The Generic AMP Link Key (GAMP_LK) is
a 256-bit link key, which is generated from the BR/EDR link key. The GAMP_LK is
stored in a security database with the BR/EDR link key after successful pairing. The
Dedicated AMP Link Key is created by the AMP Manager for particular AMP
connection types. The GAM_LK is updated to reflect creation of each new Dedicated
AMP key.
3.7 LE Security Features
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Bluetooth devices with Low Energy (LE) capabilities are designed to run with
minimum power consumption. Therefore, the security specification for LE devices is
designed to minimize cost and complexity. LE security features include device
authentication and encryption.
As with SSP, LE security defines multiple association models to reflect the
diverse input/output capabilities of LE devices. The LE association model options
include Just Works, Out of Band, and Passkey Entry, all of which are similar in
functionality to the corresponding SSP models.
Low Energy device key generation is performed by the Host on each individual
device. This is in contrast to BR/EDR devices, which perform key generation on the
Controller. This change allows the encryption algorithms to be upgraded without
affecting the Controller. As with BR/EDR security, the LE Host may create data
confidentiality and device authentication keys. Link keys are created with input from
both devices. LE pairing generates a long-term key (LTK) which is securely transferred
from one device to the other. LE security uses AES-CCM cryptography for encryption,
which is performed by the Controller, as it is on BR/EDR devices.
LE adds the ability to authenticate clear text data. This process essentially
involves signing unencrypted data to ensure the data was not modified in transit. The
sending device uses the Connection Signature Resolving Key (CSRK) to add a signature
after the Protocol Data Unit (PDU) of the packet. The signature includes Message
Authentication Code (MAC) and a counter. The counter is incremented with each signed
packet sent and is used to protect against replay attacks.
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Another LE capability addresses device privacy. A device may hide its identity
by changing its device address to a secret address. The new address is only known to
paired devices and protects the device against unauthorized tracking. This feature is
available once a successful connection has been established between trusted devices. The
Identity Resolving Key (IRK) allows for secret device addresses to be resolved to public
addresses. If device filtering is enabled, the secret address is called the private address
and is resolvable to paired device addresses. The private address is created using the
device ID key exchanged during pairing. If device filtering is disabled, the process uses a
reconnection address which is exchanged between devices at each connection. It is
possible to change the reconnection address between connections to increase the level of
protection against unauthorized tracking.
As with BR/EDR devices, LE devices and applications may designate between
multiple security modes and levels. The two modes specify the authentication, integrity
and encryption requirements for the communication traffic.
LE Security Mode 1: defines multiple encryption levels


Level 1: requires no security, no authentication or encryption will be initiated



Level 2: unauthenticated pairing with encryption



Level 3: authenticated pairing with encryption

LE Security Mode 2: multiple data signing requirements, defining integrity, does not
address confidentiality


Level 1: unauthenticated pairing with data signing



Level 2: authenticated pairing with data signing
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The Security Manager provides protocols and methods for pairing and key
distribution for LE devices. As previously mentioned, key distribution allows for identity
and encryption functions. Pairing generates keys which may optionally be used for
encryption. The Security Manager supports three security levels which specify
authentication requirements: Authenticated with MITM Protection, Unauthenticated with
No MITM Protection, and No Security Requirements
LE pairing occurs in three phases: Pairing Feature Exchange, Short Term Key
Generation, and Transport Specific Key Distribution. Figure 3.4 outlines the three stages.
As with SSP, pairing failures result in a wait interval that increases exponentially, in
order to protect against brute force attacks.

Phase 1: Pairing Feature
Exchange

Phase 2: Short Term Key
(STK) Generation

Phase 3: Transport Specific
Key Distribution (optional)

•Initiator sends pairing request
•Responder sends pairing
response

•Pairing over SMP, association
model depends on I/O
capabilities
•Just Works
•Passkey Entry
•Out‐of‐band

•Keys exchanged for encryption
•Encryption key size is between
56 bits to 128 bits, in octet
increments as defined by
application or device
capabilities

Figure 3.4: LE Pairing Process
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CHAPTER 4
BLUETOOTH VULNERABILITIES & ATTACKS

Many of the characteristics that make Bluetooth such an attractive option for
manufacturers and consumers also lead to security vulnerabilities within the technology.
First, the decentralized and ad-hoc nature of Bluetooth piconets creates openings for
eavesdropping and denial of service attacks. Second, the diversity of the specification
requires backwards compatibility and a “lowest common denominator” of security
capabilities. Third, efforts to increase end user convenience in the specification lead to
compromises in security configurations which attacks can leverage.
As with most digital security issues, Bluetooth vulnerabilities tend to fall into one
of four general categories: data confidentiality, data integrity, service availability, and
service integrity. Attacks exploit flaws associated with ease of use, backwardscompatibility, and specification flexibility. In addition, we present a method of
categorizing vulnerabilities by identifying the general root cause of the weakness. We
define three such categories: attacks exploiting design flaws/consequences, attacks
exploiting design compromises, and attacks exploiting user action/inaction. User
education on threat identification and mitigation actions provides potential to minimize
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security risks from each category of vulnerability, but most strongly in the category of
user action/inaction.
The PSP project website presents multiple examples of attacks against wireless
communications, in general, and Bluetooth communications, in particular. The growth in
commercial, industrial, and home use of Bluetooth makes the standard an increasingly
more attractive and potentially lucrative attack vector.
4.1 Risk Categories
It may be useful to group vulnerabilities into categories based on basic similarities. In this
section, we describe three such categories based on general root cause of the
vulnerability.
4.1.1 Design Compromises
Ultimately, the goal of any manufacturer is to sell their product to a consumer
who may have a range of tolerance levels for technological complexities. As such,
vendors are often in a position of finding the correct balance between user convenience
and ideal security measures. Many times, vendors make a conscious decision to
compromise security in favor of convenience. This leads to features that may be
exploited for nefarious purposes by attackers. We define this category of vulnerability as
design compromises.
One area rich with exploitable characteristics is the default configuration of
devices [18]. Manufacturers often provide minimal security and rely on consumers to
increase security as appropriate for their particular needs. Vendors may default to the
lowest security mode, an enabled Bluetooth radio, or a standardized PIN such as ‘0000’
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or ‘1234’. By relying on consumers to tighten these security features, vendors open up
easily exploitable flaws which are often ignored by the average, non-technical user.
An example of an attack associated with manufacturer defaults was publicized by
Trustwave, an information security company, in August of 2013 [19]. Bluetooth-enabled
home electronics are increasingly popular throughout the globe. In Japan, this trend
includes high-tech toilets controlled by mobile device applications via Bluetooth. Satis
toilets are sold with a hardcoded PIN of ‘0000’ and can be accessed through the My Satis
app by any device within toilet’s Bluetooth range. Commands include raising and
lowering the lid, flushing the commode, and activating the bidet. Since the PIN is not
modifiable and the BD_ADDR can be easily determined through eavesdropping or
during pairing-mode, unauthorized access to the toilet’s commands is easily obtained.
Although more humorous than malicious, these attacks would not reflect well on any
hotel deploying the Satis toilet.
4.1.2 End-User Action/Inaction
Information technology professionals jokingly refer to this category as “organic”
in nature. End-users, whether through ignorance, laziness, or miscalculation, often create
exploitable weaknesses in their technology. Users might use weak or even no passwords.
They may disable existing security measures in favor of easy access. They may fall prey
to social engineering attacks. Vendor actions to increase security will almost always
require the cooperation of the end user to be completely successful.
Another example of this category of vulnerabilities occurs as the result of theft
and loss. Bluetooth devices tend to be highly mobile, such as smartphones and tablets.
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As such, these devices are easily targeted by thieves and easily left behind by busy or
distracted end-users. In many instances, once an attacker has physical access to a
Bluetooth device, he also has access to personal data, existing pairings, and stored keys
[18].
4.1.3 Design Flaw/Consequence
Design flaws describe mistakes in the design of a standard or service. As
software and protocol complexity increases, so does the likelihood of flaws in the
implementation. Software patches and security based updates are now commonplace in
every technology category: hardware drivers, mobile operating systems, consumer and
enterprise grade infrastructure, etc. It is so prevalent that many vendors provide
subscription services to proactively obtain these corrections to their products’ flaws.
Where design flaws are unintentional, design consequences are vulnerabilities that
are inherent security costs associated with intentional design choices. Wireless
communications are rife with this type of susceptibility. By their very nature, wireless
specifications remove the possibility of physical security. In order to attack a wired
network, some sort of physical ingress is required. With wireless networks, simple
physical proximity allows some level of access to the network.
A common misconception is that the physical limitations of a device’s Bluetooth
antenna provide protection against attacks. A typical mobile device would have a Class 2
antenna providing a 10 meter maximum range [12]. This limitation implies that an
attacker would be in close proximity to the target, making the attack more difficult to
execute discreetly. However, with tools such as AIRCable
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(http://www.aircable.net/extend.php) the range of an attacking devices antenna could
increase by tenfold, allowing a Class 2 device the range of a Class 1 antenna. Bluetoone
is a homegrown version of antenna extension that involves soldering a striped coax cable
to an off-the-shelf Bluetooth adapter. This modified antenna creates a unidirectional
Bluetooth signal, rather than an omnidirectional one. The now focused signal has a
greater range than the unmodified radio [20]. This category is not dangerous, in and of
itself, but can be used in combination with other attacks to increase their potency [21].
A common attack against wireless networked hosts is unauthorized data capture
or sniffing [18]. Frequency hopping spread spectrum provides some basic protection
against interception of Bluetooth communications. However, with the right hardware and
a security mode without encryption, attackers can perform both active and passive
eavesdropping. Tools such as FTS4BT (http://www.fte.com/products/fts4bt.aspx) allow
protocol analysis and packet sniffing on any Bluetooth connection. Passive
eavesdropping involves listening to the data exchange without detection by the
communicating devices. This attack compromises data confidentiality. Passive
eavesdropping may also involve collecting authentication and encryption details which
could be utilized during a consequential attack to compromise not only confidentiality,
but also the integrity of subsequent data exchange.
Active eavesdropping potentially compromises both data confidentiality and
integrity. In this category of attack, an assailant might perform a man-in-the-middle
attack where the attacking device sits between two paired devices. The attacking device
then intercepts and potentially modifies data exchanging within the pair.

37

Another possible attack under this category is device impersonation or
obfuscation, when a paired device’s link key or BD_ADDR is spoofed by an attacker,
allowing unauthorized communication with that attacker [18]. Network devices require
some sort of identifying characteristic in order to successfully communicate across wired
or wireless networks. In Bluetooth networks, this takes the form of a device address or
BD_ADDR. Tools such as bdaddr and hciconfig allow for modification of the advertise
BD_ADDR on a Bluetooth device [21]. In addition to spoofing, this technique might also
be used to provide anonymity for an attacking device.
Another target of attack is service availability. If vendors have not adequately
accounted for attacks against device services, attackers may attempt to disrupt or disable
communicating devices through Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. These might simply be
an effort to disrupt communication or may be used to gain unauthorized access to device
services.
One documented DoS attack against Bluetooth targets a flaw in Android’s
Bluetooth stack during connections to Bluetooth LE devices, such as personal fitness
devices. When Android 4.3 devices connect to malicious LE devices, it is possible to
inject malformed General Attribute (GATT) profile commands. The stack is unable to
process this malformed data and the entire Bluetooth service crashes on the device. This
error was corrected in the subsequent release of Android, but as of the writing of this
paper, has not been addressed through a patch to Android 4.3 [22].
.
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4.2 Attacks
As with most digital security issues, Bluetooth vulnerabilities tend to fall into one
of four general categories: data confidentiality, data integrity, service availability, and
service integrity. Here we present specific documented attacks against Bluetooth devices
and their place in the root cause categorization.
4.2.1 General Attacks
Blueprinting is a potential preliminary step to a successful attack against a
Bluetooth device. While in discoverable mode, a Bluetooth device advertises
information about itself and its services to enable easy pairing between devices. The
advertised information includes the discoverable device’s unique and fixed Bluetooth
address, the BD_ADDR. With Blueprinting, an attacker attempts to collect and analyze
that information in order to find potential vulnerabilities. With the BD_ADDR, an
attacker can determine the manufacturer of the device and can then find known security
flaws associated with that vendor’s products. Using the additional information found in
the Bluetooth Service Discovery Protocol, the attacker can find the profiles available on
that device, as well as security requirements to successfully request those services [20].
Malware infections potentially pose a great threat to Bluetooth enabled devices.
Once infected, a device’s data and services may be compromised in a number of ways.
The infected device may also be used to propagate the infection to other Bluetooth
devices. In June 2004, Cabir was identified as the first known worm to target mobile
devices. The worm infected smartphones running Symbian OS and utilized Bluetooth to
propagate from device to device. CommWarrior, in 2005, and Beselo, in 2007, also
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infected Symbian OS devices via Bluetooth and accessed MMS services on the device
[23]. In each case, the worm propagated to vulnerable devices by monitoring the infected
devices’ Bluetooth channel for susceptible devices advertising services via SDP and
actively attempted to replicate itself onto that vulnerable device.
4.2.2 Service Availability Attacks
BlueSmack is a DoS attack and uses L2CAP pings to disrupt a Bluetooth-enabled
device. L2CAP pings are intended to test connectivity on a device for troubleshooting
purposes. However, by flooding a device with requests or sending very large packets, the
tool can be used to overwhelm and disable a device [20].
Fuzzing is another example of a DoS attack. During a fuzzing attempt, an
attacker intentionally injects malformed data at various stages of communication using
L2CAP, A2DP or HFP. In testing, fuzzing caused erratic behavior on 80% of devices
tested. This behavior ranged from reboots to permanent disabling of the device [24].
BlueChop is another type of DoS attack. During the attack, a non-member of a
scatternet or piconet spoofs a slave and contacts the master. Since the master sees two
connections from the same slave, its state is compromised, which disrupts the scatternet
or piconet. In order for this attack to succeed, the targeted master must support multiple
connections [20].
4.2.3 Data Confidentiality & Integrity Attacks
An example of a MITM attack that takes advantage of slack security within the
Bluetooth specification is BT-SSP-Printer-MITM. This attack leverages use of Just
Works authentication between a Bluetooth device and a printer. The attacker performs a
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DoS attack against the device with the intention of forcing the user to remove and
recreate the printer pairing. Once the removal occurs, the attacker uses obfuscation
methods to pose as the printer to the device and as the device to the printer. From here,
any print jobs are intercepted by the attacker, who then forwards them to the printer in an
effort to stay hidden [21].
BlueSnarfing is another attack which takes advantage of inadequate security on a
Bluetooth device. The goal of the attack is to obtain unauthorized access to data and
services on the target device. If the target device is in discoverable mode or the attacker
is able to determine the BD_ADDR address of the device and authentication is not
required by the device, the attacker can access files, such as contact lists and calendars.
This is done by connecting to the Object Exchange (OBEX) Push Profile and sending a
command requesting common file names, such as telecom/pb.vcf for a contact list
[20][25]. Most modern phones are no longer susceptible to BlueSnarfing because of
better security implementations addressing authentication requirements.
Bluebugging exploits a security loophole in the firmware of Bluetooth-enabled
cell phones that allows an attacker unauthorized access to data and cellular services.
Potentially more damaging than BlueSnarfing, Bluebugging allows an attacker to issue
attention or AT commands without the knowledge of the device owner. These
commands give the attacker the ability to make phone calls (for eavesdropping and theft
of services), set call forwarding, send and read SMS text messages (for eavesdropping,
theft of services, or tracking a device since SMS is location based), access and modify
contact lists, and utilize the device’s Internet connection [20].
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Bluejacking or OBEX file transfer attack is the process of sending an unsolicited
message to a Bluetooth device. The technique is often used to send generally harmless
information for pranks or guerilla marketing purposes. The attack, however, could
potentially be used as a social engineering tactic or to send malicious information.
Bluejacking takes advantage of Bluetooth devices that advertise file transfer
services. These devices may potentially accept unauthenticated and unencrypted file
transfer requests from anonymous sources. Depending on the targeted device’s
capabilities and security mechanisms, this type of attack could range from ineffectual to
harmless, but annoying, or all the way to potentially dangerous and destructive. The
attack is primarily aimed at Bluetooth-enabled handheld devices such as cell phones and
tablets. The success of the attack depends on the Bluetooth services offered by the
targeted device and the device’s security measures.
First, a Bluejacking attack finds discoverable Bluetooth devices. Next, if the
discovered devices advertise file transfer services, which do not require authentication or
encryption, the attacker tries to transfer a file to the target device via an OBEX push
command. Depending on the targeted device, the file may be a JPEG, a binary, or a
simple text file. Last, if the target device or user accepts the file, the attack succeeds.
For devices that do not require pairing prior to a file transfer, there are multiple
scenarios where an attacker might cause damage by exploiting this security weakness.
First, an attacker might use this technique in a social engineering attack. One advertised
use for Bluejacking is guerilla marketing [26]. A museum, mall, or tourist attraction may
present additional content or sales offers through Bluetooth messaging. If an attacker
were to find one of these locations and pose as a legitimate source of information, he or
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she could redirect a victim to an illicit website. From there, the attack could query for
personal information from the victim.
A second potential Bluejacking attack might mimic a Trojan horse attack. File
transfer services allow for the transfer of text, graphic, and binary files, including Java jar
files. Many handheld device operating systems are configured to receive update files
from the device vendor. An attacker could send a message formatted in a similar way as
the vendor updates and entice the user to open and run the file. From there, the attacker
might use Bluebugging or Bluesnarfing attacks against the device.
An additional example of an attacker exploiting poor default security for
unauthorized direct data access is Car Whisperer. Bluetooth is increasingly common in
late model cars for services such as hands free connections to cell phones and to stream
music from MP3 players. Car Whisperer exploits the use of standard PINs on hands free
units in cars, such as ‘0000’ or ‘1234’, to connect and utilize the connected mobile device
or eavesdrop on conversations [20].
A BlueBump attack begins with social engineering. An attacker exchanges
authorized data, such as a digital business card, with the target. Rather than closing the
connection after this exchange, the attacker keeps the connection open and deletes the
link key. The attacker then requests a link key regeneration and retains that key for later
unauthorized use. This extended access is not known by the target user and gives the
attacker access to data beyond the original exchange of information [20].
BlueDumping is an impersonation attack which attempts to force a key
renegotiation in order to eavesdrop on the key-exchange process during the renegotiation.
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The attacker spoofs the BD_ADDR of a known, authorized device in an existing pair and
connects to the paired partner. When the target initiates an authentication request during
what it perceives as a reconnection attempt, the attacker sends
“HCI_Link_Key_Request_Negative_Reply”, indicating that it does not have a link key.
This may force the target partner into pairing mode in order to obtain a new, valid key. If
the attacker is able to determine the link key, he may access services on the target device,
even if those services require authentication [20].
An example of an attack against Bluetooth LE exploits the fact that LE provides
no protection against passive eavesdropping with any of the three available pairing
methods, Just Works, Out of Band, or Passkey Entry. An eavesdropper can obtain the
encrypted temporary key (TK), which is used for authentication. From there, a program
such as Crackle can decrypt the TK in less than one second. A known TK can lead to the
long-term key (LTK). If LTK is reused in other communication, then all communication
with that LE device is compromised [27].
Table 4.1 summarizes how the previously discussed vulnerabilities and attacks fit
into our suggested root cause categories.
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Table 4.1: Root Cause Categories
Root Cause Category

Overview

Vulnerabilities/Attacks

Design Compromise

Vendors intentional choose a less
secure design to increase usability
and convenience.

User Action/Inaction

Users override, disable, or bypass
vendor security through conscious
or unconscious actions.
Vendors design software/firmware
with unknown exploitable flaws or
create inherent exploitable
weaknesses as a result of design
characteristics.

Standardized default PINs, Just
Works, BT-SSP-Printer-MITM,
Bluesnarfing, Bluejacking, Car
Whisperer
Theft and loss, Bluejacking,
BlueBump, out-of-date device

Design
Flaw/Consequence

Blueprinting, Bluetoone,
Bdaddr, hciconfig, Fuzzing,
Eavesdropping, Malware,
BlueSmack, BlueChop,
Bluesnarfing, Bluebugging,
BlueBump, Bluejacking,
BlueDump, Crackle

4.3 Mitigation
The three suggested root cause categories presented here can provide basic
guidance for mitigation efforts addressing attacks in each category. Each of the previous
attacks takes advantage of vulnerabilities that exist as a result of the emphasis the
Bluetooth SIG and vendors place on device usability and backwards compatibility, flaws
within the design implementation, consequences of design choices, or end user
intervention.
4.3.1 End User Action/Inaction
In many ways, this category is the easiest for which to find mitigation options and
the most difficult in which to implement that mitigation.
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End users may take numerous steps to avoid attacks against their Bluetooth
enabled devices. These include disabling Bluetooth when not in use, keeping the device
out of discoverable mode except when pairing, and utilizing Security Mode 3 or higher.
Security Mode 3 requires authentication, encryption, and authorization for any
connection to the device, including service discovery. By requiring authentication for all
communication, unauthorized connections are not allowed. Additionally, since all
communication is encrypted, interception of the session keys and sensitive data is far
more difficult [19].
However, end users may not be aware of the risks associated with unrestrained
and unsecured use of Bluetooth communications. User education is critical to both the
security of current technology and the continued trust, and therefore use, of future
technologies. Vendors would do well to consider that in the balance between
convenience and security; eventually immediate convenience will become too
burdensome as long-term security is routinely compromised. At a minimum, vendors
should default to the most secure options and actively warn users when their choices
override vendor security recommendations.
To increase Bluetooth device security, end users should:
1. Disable Bluetooth when not in use.
2. Enable discoverable mode only when needed.
3. Remove any lost devices from pairing lists.
4. Never respond to unexpected pairing requests.
5. Enable the highest security mode possible.
6. Apply device updates on a regular basis.
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4.3.2 Design Compromise
In many instances the security compromises associated with ease of use are
minimal. Peripherals such as speakers or headphones may not be as critical to secure, as
other, more richly feature devices. In these cases, low security features, such as Just
Works or standardized PINs, may be appropriate. However, vendors should be extremely
conservative when selecting ease of implementation over security. In addition, they
should provide warnings and prompt for user consent to any ease of use feature that
might compromise data and service integrity or confidentiality.
4.3.3 Design Flaw/Consequence
In many instances, these flaws may not be avoidable. However, vendor and
developers should deploy a minimum set of best practices to mitigate the risks these pose,
whether acknowledged or unanticipated, as outlined below [28][29]:
1. Disable Bluetooth by default and prompt for user authorization when enabling.
2. Require authentication and authorization to access all services.
3. Encrypt key and data exchange.
4. Store link keys securely.
5. Require regular expiration and renegotiation of link keys.
6. Randomize PINs associated with Passkey Entry devices.
7. Default to the highest security mode possible.
8. Default to automatic system and application updates.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Our experiment attempted to determine whether a direct effort to provide
technology users with hands-on education would result in user attitude changes
concerning device use and preventative security measures. We focus our education
efforts on security best practices and common vulnerabilities associated with popular
wireless technologies.
5.1 Experimental Motivation
Numerous research studies examine the relationship between technology user
knowledge and security behaviors. In our awareness, previous studies have focused on
one-way communications with users. Study subjects were asked about existing
perceptions or were presented with packaged communications highlighting threats and
recommended actions. In contrast, our efforts focused on user education through
demonstrations and participatory projects. We surveyed study participants on existing
security attitudes. Participants then completed our educational activities and were
surveyed again. Our goal was to prompt an increase in user intention to execute
preventative security measures.
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Caldwell et al. explore how two models of behavior prediction, the Theories of
Reasoned Action and Planned Behavior, might apply to technology use [8]. Both
theories posit that intention is an effective predictor of future behavior. The Theory of
Planned Behavior also accounts for level of commitment. According to the theory, the
stronger the intention of the individual, the more likely that individual is to follow
through on the intended action. Planned Behavior also accounts for the pressure social
factors place on the individual’s intentions and the effects of the individual’s perception
of his or her ability to execute the intended action. This applies well to technology
security as the theory addresses differences in user knowledge and skill. Caldwell et al.
found that framing of the threat communication was critical to the success of the behavior
modification.
Liang et al. evaluate the efficacy of the Technology Threat Avoidance Theory [9].
They found that user execution of recommended mitigation actions is determined by the
perception of the severity of the threat and the individual’s vulnerability to the threat.
Individuals also take into account cost and effectiveness of the recommended action and
perception of their own technical competency when evaluating recommended actions.
Johnston adds to this concept by specifically examining the effect of fear appeals or
negative communications about the threat on the likelihood of performance of mitigation
actions [10]. Each of these studies explores the effects of passive communications on the
attitudes and intended behaviors of technology users. Study subjects were told of the
threats and their mitigation options.
We explore how direct education affects those behaviors. In this study, our
efforts were focused on showing the participants and allowing them to explore the threats
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and mitigations. In addition to targeting the user’s perception of the severity and
likelihood of an attack, we also target the individual’s level of technical knowledge and
confidence in the efficacy of the mitigation actions. We approach this education process
through demonstrations and hands-on projects communicated to the participants via a
publically accessible website.
5.2 Experiment Overview
Our hypothesis was that direct user education on practical, real world security
risks may affect user attitudes towards security practices when using ubiquitous
consumer computing devices. We believed that when users were given the opportunity to
conduct hands-on projects and observe demonstrations of known attacks against common
communication technologies that attention to security risks and awareness of mitigation
options would increase. Our participants are college students in various graduate and
undergraduate classes over the course of several semesters in 2012 and 2013.
Our study includes a pre-survey, user education, and a post-survey. Both surveys
measured sensitivity and awareness of security and privacy issues concerning use of
wireless communication technologies with personal computing devices. The pre-survey
included questions identifying current use and security practices. The post-survey
measured intended future use of devices. The user education stage involved hands-on
projects and attack demonstrations based on content presented through the Pervasive
Security & Privacy project website.
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5.4 Participants
Experiment participants were students in Computer Science courses taken at
University of Alabama Huntsville and Alabama A&M University. Both universities are
located in Huntsville, AL. Fifty-six students participated in the experiment during the
Fall and Spring semesters of 2012 and 2013. Study participants included diversity in
gender, age, education levels, and ethnicity. The procedures of the experiment
were approved by our university’s IRB. Figures 5.1-5.4 summarize the demographic
characteristics of our participant pool. The majority (51.8%) of study participants
identified as Caucasian, with a sizable percentage identifying as Asian or Asian
American (17.9%) and African or African American (21.4%). The remainder identified
as Hispanic or Hispanic American (1.8%) and Other (7.1%). The bulk of participants
were between the ages of 18 and 25 (48.2%), with 23.2% between the ages of 26 and 30
and 14.3% between the ages of 31 and 35. The remaining participants were above 35
years old. Males made up roughly 4/5 of our study. The majority of participants were
undergraduates, with another 1/5 indicating they were graduate students and the rest
indicating they were at the high school level.
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Figure 5.1: Participant Ethnicity

Figure 5.2: Participant Age

Figure 5.3: Participant Gender

Figure 5.4: Participant Education Level

5.5 Pre-survey
The pre-survey was given prior to introducing participants to the Pervasive
Security & Privacy project website. The survey was presented in paper form after
receiving a signed informed consent form from participants. The survey consisted of
demographic, experience, knowledge, and device use questions. The complete presurvey can be found in Appendix A. Participants were asked to identify how long they
had used Bluetooth and Wi-Fi wireless communication technologies, what types of
mobile devices they utilized, and what sorts of activities they performed with those
devices. The survey included questions designed to determine the participants’ technical
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knowledge and awareness of device configuration options. In addition, participants
ranked their willingness to take recommended security and privacy precautions, to utilize
publicly accessible Wi-Fi networks, and personal data privacy concerns. Questions
addressing sensitivity to personal data privacy concerns were adapted from
questionnaires presented in research documented by Zhu et al. [11].
5.6 Pervasive Security & Privacy Project
After completion of the pre-survey, participants were asked to review the contents
and demonstrations presented on the Pervasive Security & Privacy (PSP) project website.
The website can be found at: http://pervasive.cs.uah.edu/PSP/. Various individuals
associated with the University of Alabama Huntsville have contributed research in the
form of articles and videos to the project.
The website addresses security and privacy concerns arising from the increased
use of personal mobile devices, also known as pervasive computing. These devices take
many forms, including the obvious, smartphones and tablets, and the more novel, heart
rate monitors and optical head-mounted displays. Most pervasive computing devices use
wireless communications technology to maintain their small form factors and mobility.
The PSP project website focuses on two common wireless communications standards,
Bluetooth and Wi-Fi [30].
The PSP project presents a paradigm for understanding security and privacy risks
and mitigations at three levels: the Application level, the Wireless Network level, and the
Node level. The Application level represents software and service that run on the
pervasive device, such as Service Discovery Protocols. The Wireless Network level
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represents the communications protocols and standards utilized by the devices, such as
Bluetooth and Wi-Fi. Finally, the Node level represents the individual device. The
project also categorizes mitigation efforts by the role that might implement them, i.e.
user, programmer, or administrator [30].
Participants in our study were asked to view demonstrations of documented
attacks against the three levels, as well as presentations on the various technologies and
programming methods associated with pervasive computing devices. In addition,
participants recreated an attack of his or her choice. This hands-on project required the
participant to witness vulnerabilities within the various wireless technologies and mobile
devices.
Project and demonstrations topics available to participants include:


Service Discovery Protocols



Authentication Services



Certificate Services



Bluetooth API libraries



Attacks against Bluetooth communications



Attacks against Wi-Fi communications
Specifically, the author contributed content providing education on Bluetooth

Java API libraries, an overview of Bluetooth and Bluetooth security, and a demonstration
of an OBEX file transfer attack against a Bluetooth enabled device. Figure 5.5 shows a
screenshot of the OBEX file transfer attack demonstration.
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Figure 5.5: Demonstration from PSP Website
5.7 Post-survey
The post-survey was given after the participants completed the projects and
demonstrations presented on PSP project website. This survey was shorter than the presurvey and included the same demographic and technical knowledge questions. The
post-survey addressed the participants’ perceptions and opinions of the PSP project
website, as well as their intended future wireless use and adherence to recommended
security and privacy actions. The complete post-survey can be found in Appendix B.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS & KEY FINDINGS

In this chapter, we review the results of our experiment and highlight key findings
from a comparison of the pre and post-surveys.
6.1 Participant Profiles & Device Use
Our study focused on use of personal mobile devices (smartphones and tablets)
and wireless communications technologies. In the pre-survey, we asked participants to
describe their device use and experience. We found that 92.9% of study participants
owned at least one mobile device, with 19.6% owning three or more such devices.
Participants utilized Apple iOS, Android, and Windows devices. Participants who
utilized such devices overwhelming used them on a daily basis. The majority, 58.9%
used their devices several times a day. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 summarize the number of
devices utilized by individual participants and the frequency of device use.
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Figure 6.1: Number of Mobile Devices Utilized
by Study Participants

Figure 6.2: Mobile Device Use Frequency

We also found that those participants who utilized personal mobile devices did so
for personal purposes, with roughly one third of participants also using them for
professional purposes. Figure 6.3 summarizes the nature of activities performed with
participants’ devices.

Figure 6.3: Personal & Professional Use of Mobile
Devices

The majority of participants used their mobile devices for a number of activities,
including productivity tasks such as checking email and calendar, financial tasks such as
banking, shopping, gaming, and entertainment. Only eight participants indicated that
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they did not use their devices for productivity, financial, or shopping tasks. Figure 6.4

Number of Participants

summarizes they types of activities performed with participants’’ devices.
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Figure 6.4: Activities Performed With Devices

The survey also addressed length of experience with both Bluetooth and Wi-Fi
communications technologies. We found that participant experience with Wi-Fi
networking was much more dominant than experience with Bluetooth communications.
Only roughly two thirds of participants had more than 2 years of Bluetooth use
experience, whereas 87.5% of participants had more than 2 years of Wi-Fi experience.
We also found that 12.5% of participants had never used Bluetooth and only 5.4% of
participants had never used Wi-Fi communications. Figures 6.5 and 6.6 summarize
participants’ length of experience with both wireless communications technologies.
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Figure 6.5: Length of Bluetooth Experience

Figure 6.6: Length of Wi-Fi Experience

The pre-survey included questions designed to determine tolerance for privacy
concerns among survey participants. We asked participants to rank their level of concern
for keeping various types of personal information private. We found that the majority of
participants found most categories of personal information considerably important or
extremely important to keep private. The exceptions were age and gender, although a
significant minority found age to be considerably important or extremely important to
keep private. Almost all participants found it considerably important or extremely
important to keep credit card and driver’s license numbers private. It is also significant to
note that at least one participant found each of the categories not at all important to keep
private, including credit card number. Figure 6.7 presents the frequency of each ranking
for the personal data privacy priority questions.
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Participant Ranking of Personal Data Privacy Concerns
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Figure 6.7: Personal Data Privacy Priorities

6.2 Comparison of Pre & Post-Survey Results
The pre-survey and post-survey included duplicate questions in order to allow us
to compare and contrast participant attitudes before and after the user education stage of
the experiment. The pre-survey questions focused on current behaviors, whereas the
post-survey questions queried for intended future behaviors. As numerous studies on
behavioral predication indicate, intention is an effective predictor of future behavior [8,
9]. As such, we believe that these comparisons will be highly indicative of changes in
user security attitudes and behavior.
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Both surveys included a question asking what activities the participants performed
on their mobile devices while connected to publicly accessible Wi-Fi networks. We
found significant differences between the two surveys for three questions. The number of
participants indicating they were not comfortable using public Wi-Fi increased by eight
individuals. The number of individuals willing to perform financial tasks on public Wi-Fi
fell by five and the number willing to check email fell by 16 individuals. All three of
these questions saw a greater than 40% change in participant responses.

Table 6.1: Pre- and Post-Survey Results Regarding Activities on Public Wi-Fi
Activities Performed On
Public Wi-Fi

PreSurvey

PostSurvey
19

Delta Between
Pre- and PostSurveys
+8

% Change
from Pre- to
Post-Survey
73%

Not Comfortable Utilizing
Public Wi-Fi
Use Financial or Shopping
Applications
Check Email

11
12

7

-5

42%

33

17

-16

49%

The pre-survey and post-survey included identical questions asking participants
how likely they were to take the following preventative measures when utilizing their
personal mobile devices:


Disable Wi-Fi on your phone when not in a trusted area:



Use “Just Works” setup for Bluetooth devices:



Only use manual setup for Bluetooth devices:



Pair with an unknown Bluetooth device that requests access:
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Disable Bluetooth on your mobile device when not using Bluetooth connectivity:



Set a passcode on your mobile device:



Configure your mobile device to autolock after a period of inactivity:



Swap to my cell phone data provider network when in public Wi-Fi places:



Connect to a secure network using VPN at a public Wi-Fi network
A ranking of 1 indicated that the participant was completely unlikely to take the

action and a ranking a 5 indicated that the participant was extremely likely to take the
action. We considered an increase of more than 10% of the population indicating they
were likely and a decrease of more than 10% indicating they were unlikely to follow
recommended security practices significant for our study. We found significant
differences in two actions, likeliness to disable Bluetooth when not in use and likeliness
to disable Wi-Fi when not in a trusted area. Both of these actions are the easiest and most
effective methods to mitigate all attacks targeting wireless communications technologies.
The number of participants completely unlikely or somewhat unlikely to disable
Bluetooth services on their devices when not using those services fell from 15 to 3. This
represents a decrease of 22% of total participants. The number of participants who were
very likely or extremely likely to disable Bluetooth services rose from 38 to 48. This
represents an increase of 15% of total participants. Figures 6.10 and 6.11 compare pre
and post-survey intent to disable Bluetooth services when not in use.
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Figure 6.9: Likely to Disable Bluetooth (Post-Survey)

Figure 6.8: Likely to Disable Bluetooth (Pre-Survey)

The number of participants who were completely unlikely or somewhat unlikely
to disable Wi-Fi capabilities when in an untrusted area with their mobile devices fell from
13 to 8 individuals. This is a decrease of 13% of participants. The number of participants
who were very likely or extremely likely to disable Wi-Fi when in an untrusted area
increased from 32 to 39 individuals. This is an increase of 12% of participants. Figures
6.12 and 6.13 compare pre and post-survey intent to disable Wi-Fi in untrusted locations.

Figure 6.10: Likely to Disable Wi-Fi (Pre-Survey)

Figure 6.11: Likely to Disable Wi-Fi (Post-Survey)
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Changes in user attitudes on the remaining questions were not significant. We
found that for the remaining questions comparisons between pre and post-survey results
represented less than a 10% increase in intention to follow recommendations or 10%
decrease in intention to disregard recommended actions. Table 6.2 summarizes the
percentage of participants who responded they were very likely or extremely likely and
somewhat unlikely or completely unlikely to perform the security action.

Table 6.2: Participant Security Action Intention
Just
Works

% Likely
% Unlikely

6%
66%

% Likely
% Unlikely

15%
53%

Likely
Unlikely

+9%
‐13%

Manual
Setup

Pair
Swap
Set
Use
With
Data To
Access
Auto‐lock
Unknown Provider PIN
Pre‐Survey Results
56%
4%
44%
81%
85%
26%
96%
37%
9%
9%
Post‐Survey Results
69%
9%
54%
80%
82%
18%
89%
30%
7%
9%
Difference
+13%
+5%
+10%
‐1%
‐3%
‐8%
‐15%
‐14%
‐2%
0%

Figure 6.14 provides the graphical comparisons between these security action
intention questions.
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Security Intentions

Use “Just Works” setup for Bluetooth devices
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Pair with an unknown Bluetooth device that requests
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Extremely
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Pair With Unknown (Post)

65

Swap to my cell phone data provider network when in
public Wi‐Fi places
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Swap Data To Provider (Pre)

Swap Data To Provider (Post)

Set a passcode on your mobile device
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Set Passcode (Pre)

Set Passcode (Post)

Configure your mobile device to autolock after a
period of inactivity
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Figure 6.12: Participant Security Action Intention Comparisons
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There was also minimal change in participant intention to connect to Wi-Fi
networks provided by specific organizations. In the pre-survey, participants were asked
“How often do you connect your device(s) to publically accessible Wi-Fi networks in the
following locations?” A ranking of 1 indicated never and a ranking of 5 indicated very
often. The post-survey focused on future intention with the question “How likely are you
to connect your device(s) to publically accessible Wi-Fi networks in the following
locations?” A ranking of 1 indicated completely unlikely and a ranking of 5 indicated
extremely likely. Figure 6.15 summarizes responses to these two questions.
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Pre-Survey Results

Post-Survey Results
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Figure 6.13: Connect to Public Wi-Fi Networks
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6.3 Impressions of Pervasive Security & Privacy Website and Projects
The post-survey included a section asking participants to indicate their
impressions of the PSP project website. Overall opinions of the site and its projects and
demonstrations were positive. A sampling of the quotes participants provided when
asked “Do you have any suggestions to improve the PSP website?” show active
evaluation of the site.
“PSP website is good, easy to access, materials are delivered in a easy way, nice website
as a whole.”
“No, it worked well when I used it & everything was layed (sic) out in an easy/intuitive
format.”
“Good website, a little more background on attacks would be good.”
Participants were asked to indicate their opinions of the PSP website with a series
of statements. A ranking of 1 indicated that the individual strongly agreed with the
statement. A ranking of 5 indicated the individual strongly disagreed with the statement.
Figure 6.16 summarizes the responses.
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Impressions of Pervasive Security & Privacy Website

Figure 6.14: Impressions of PSP Website
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6.4 Incongruities
Although the majority of comparisons between participant attitudes in the presurvey and post-survey were positive or neutral, participant answers to questions testing
knowledge of Bluetooth and Wi-Fi communications were not as expected. The number
of incorrect answers to basic questions about the technologies did not significantly
decrease between the two surveys. This suggests that although the projects and
demonstrations made an impression on the project participants, their technical knowledge
may not have increased as much as we had hoped. Figures 6.17-6.20 summarize the
results of the wireless technology knowledge questions.

What is meant by the term
"unsecured wireless network"?

What is meant by the term
"unsecured wireless network"?

Correct Answers

Correct Answers

Incorrect Answers

Incorrect Answers

32%
43%
57%
68%

Figure 6.15: Pre-Survey Wi-Fi Knowledge

Figure 6.16: Post-Survey Wi-Fi Knowledge

What Is Bluetooth Discovery
Mode?
Correct Answers

What Is Bluetooth Discovery
Mode?

Incorrect Answers

Correct Answers

16%

Incorrect Answers
30%

70%

84%

Figure 6.17: Pre-Survey Bluetooth Knowledge Figure 6.18: Post-Survey Bluetooth Knowledge
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK

Based on the comparisons of the results from the pre-survey and post-survey, we
believe that our hypothesis, that direct user education on practical, real world security
risks may affect user attitudes towards security practices when using ubiquitous
consumer computing devices, is promising. We found a significant increase in the
number of participants who were willing to change their use of mobile devices to address
security concerns. Participants indicated they intended to disable both Bluetooth and WiFi services in situations where the services may increase the vulnerability of the device.
They also indicated intent to change their activities when connected to publically
accessible Wi-Fi networks to avoid exposing sensitive information, such as email and
financial data. We also found an overall positive impression of the usefulness and design
of the PSP project website.
Given these conclusions, we believe additional exploration of the thesis would be
worthwhile. Based on our experience with the experimental process, we would
recommend making changes in any additional work. First, we should track individuals
from pre-survey to post-survey. Identifying how participants’ knowledge level increase
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correlates to intended security actions would be useful. Second, to avoid manual entry of
survey data, a digital survey should be implemented for any future work.
Any additional experiments should build on the scope of the results presented in
this thesis. We would recommend implementing control groups in future work. One
group of participants should receive only passive communications, such as warnings
about attacks and explicit behavior suggestions. The second group should go through the
PSP education process. A post-survey should compare the resulting change in user
intent. In addition, more diversity in the participant pool would be ideal. All of our
participants were college students studying technology and computer science. Noncollege students or students from other areas of study would provide a more meaningful
data set.
Finally, based on feedback from participants, adding additional projects to the
PSP project website, including projects addressing multiple platforms, may increase the
effectiveness of the user education stage.
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APPENDIX A
PRE-SURVEY TEXT
1. What is your age?
Bluetooth.
A.

13-17

B.

18-25

C.

26-30

A.

A wireless communication technology

D.

30-35

B.

E.

36-45

Hardware that connects remotely to your
cell phone

F.

46-55

C.

An infrared-capable device

G.

56-65

D.

Products such as keyboards and mice that
wirelessly connect to computers

H.

65+

E.

None of these

F.

I don’t know

1. What is Bluetooth?

2. What is your gender?
2. How long have you used Bluetooth devices?
A.

Male

B.

Female

3. What is your ethnicity?

A.

African American or African heritage

B.

Asian American or Asian heritage

C.

Caucasian American or European heritage

D.

Hispanic American or Hispanic heritage

E.

Other (please specify)

4. Current Education Level

A.

High School

B.

Undergraduate

C.

Graduate

A.

Never

B.

<1 year

C.

1-2 years

D.

3-4 years

E.

5+ year

3. What is Bluetooth Discoverable mode?

A.

It enables other Bluetooth devices to connect
to the device.

B.

It enables devices to discover other
Bluetooth devices.

C.

It allows other cell phones to view files on
the device.

D.

It advertises services and connection details
on a Bluetooth-enabled device.

76

E.

It allows a Bluetooth device to query for
other Bluetooth devices.

A.

Communication on the network is
unencrypted.

F.

None of these

B.

The network is known to have viruses.

G.

I don’t know

C.

No password is required to connect to the
network.

D.

Users on the network can view files on one
another’s computers.

E.

None of these

F.

I don’t know

4. How do you secure your Bluetooth devices?

A.

Use the default setting

B.

Turn Bluetooth off

C.

Enable Bluetooth encryption operations

D.

Use Bluetooth device pairing

E.

None of these

F.

I don’t know

4. To secure your Wi-Fi networks, which wireless
security protocol do you choose? (Please check all
that apply.)

Wi-Fi.
1. How long have you used Wi-Fi devices?

A.

Never

B.

<1 year

C.

1-2 years

D.

3-4 years

E.

5+ year

Never

B.

At home

C.

For work

D.

Others:

WEP

B.

VPN

C.

WPA/WPA2

D.

SES

E.

Others

F.

Use push button technology

G.

None of these

H.

I don’t know

Devices and usage
1. How many smartphone or tablet-type devices do
you routinely use?

2. Have you ever set up Wi-Fi routers? (Please check
all that apply. )

A.

A.

A.

None

B.

1

C.

2

D.

3

E.

4+

2. Which of the following mobile devices do you
use? (Please check all that apply. )

3. What is meant by the term “unsecured wireless
network”?

A.
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iPad/iPhone

B.

Windows phone/tablet

C.

Connect Bluetooth keyboard to my device.

C.

Android phone/tablet

D.

D.

Blackberry phone/tablet

Exchange contacts or other data with other
Bluetooth devices.

E.

Other smartphone or tablet (please specify):

E.

Connect to my laptop or desktop.

7. What types of activities do you perform on your
device using publically accessible Wi-Fi networks?
(Please check all that apply)

3. Is this device(s) for personal or professional use?

A.

Personal

B.

Professional

A.

Surf the Internet

C.

Both

B.

Check email

C.

Access financial or shopping apps

D.

Listen to streaming radio

E.

Watch movies or TV shows

4. How often do you use the mobile device(s)?

A.

Several times a day

F.

Play multi-player games

B.

Daily

G.

I never access public Wi-Fi networks.

C.

Weekly

H.

Others:

D.

Rarely
8. What are the default Wi-Fi security settings for
your device? (Check all that apply)

5. What types of apps do you utilize on your mobile
device? (Please check all that apply. )

A.
Productivity (note-taking, calendar, file
synchronization, document creation, etc. )

A.

The device prompts you to join available
Wi-Fi networks.

B.

Manually join available Wi-Fi networks.

B.
)

Financial (banking, credit cards, budget, etc.

C.

Device notifies or warns me if the Wi-Fi
network is unsecure.

C.

Shopping (Ebay, Etsy, etc. )

D.

Wi-Fi is enabled by default on my device.

D.

Games

E.

Wi-Fi is disabled by default on my device.

E.

Entertainment (Hulu, Netflix, etc. )

F.

I am unaware of the default settings on my
device.

F.

Other :

G.

Other (please specify):

6. What types of activities do you perform on your
device using Bluetooth? (Please check all that apply.)

A.

Use Bluetooth headsets or headphones.

B.

Connect to Hands-free services in my car.

9. What are the default Bluetooth settings for your
device? (Check all that apply)

A.

78

The device accepts unauthenticated and
unencrypted communication.

B.

The device requires a PIN.

C.

The device stays in discoverable mode for a
limited amount of time.

D.

The device requires that a particular menu is
active to enable discoverable mode.

E.

The device stays in discoverable mode until
I disable it.

F.

Bluetooth is enabled by default.

G.

Bluetooth is disabled by default.

H.

I am unaware of the default setting on my
device

I.

Other (please specify):

2. How often do you connect your device(s) to
publically accessible Wi-Fi networks in the following
locations?

1. ) Never
2. ) Almost never
3. ) Sometimes
4. ) Frequently
5. ) Very often








Rankings
1. How likely are you to take the following actions
concerning your mobile device(s)?



Airport:
Fast food Restaurant (Burger King, Panera, etc.):
Public Library:
School (university, high school):
Coffee shop (Starbucks, Joe Mugs, etc.):
Bookstore (Barnes and Noble, Books a Million,
etc.):
Religious organization (Church, synagogue,
mosque, etc.):

1. ) Completely Unlikely
2. ) Somewhat Unlikely

3. Do you feel secure to access Internet via Wi-Fi at
the following places?

3. ) Somewhat Likely
4. ) Very Likely

1. ) Almost Always True

5. ) Extremely Likely

2. ) Usually True










3. ) Occasionally True

Disable Wi-Fi on your phone when not in a
trusted area:
Use “Just Works” setup for Bluetooth devices:
Only use manual setup for Bluetooth devices:
Pair with an unknown Bluetooth device that
requests access:
Disable Bluetooth on your mobile device when
not using Bluetooth connectivity:
Set a passcode on your mobile device:
Configure your mobile device to autolock after a
period of inactivity:
Swap to my cell phone data provider network
when in public Wi-Fi places:
Connect to a secure network using VPN at a
public Wi-Fi network

4. ) Usually Not True









Airport:
Fast food Restaurant (Burger King, Panera,
etc.):
Public Library:
School (university, high school):
Coffee shop (Starbucks, Joe Mugs, etc.):
Bookstore (Barnes and Noble, Books a
Million, etc.):
Religious organization (Church, synagogue,
mosque, etc.):

4. The following questions ask you to identify the
type of information that you think are important to
keep private. In this context, 'privacy' refers to
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information about yourself that you think should not
be accessed without your consent or control.



Please circle the number corresponding to how
important it is to keep each of the types of
information private.





Price discrimination (offer best prices to VIP
members):
Transfer or sale of your identity or private
information to other companies:
Identity theft:
Private information being used against you later:
Knowing your financial situation:

1.) Not at all Important
6. The following questions ask about the steps that
you may or may not take to maintain your security.
How often do you engage in the following behaviors?

2.) Minimally Important
3.) Somewhat Important
4.) Considerably Important
5.) Extremely important

1. ) Never
2. ) Almost never
















Gender :
Date of Birth (month, day and year):
Birthday (month and day):
Age:
Zip code:
Home Address:
Credit card number:
Phone number:
Monthly Income:
Monthly Expenses:
Driver's License Number:
Birth Place:
Photos:
Current location:

3. ) Sometimes
4. ) Frequently
5. ) Very often








5. Indicate how concerned you are about each of the
following possible threats to your security. In this
context, 'security' refers to a concern about someone
or a company being able to potentially harm you
(financially, socially or legally).






1. ) Not at all
2. ) A little
3. ) Sometimes
4. ) Very concerned
5. ) Extremely concerned



A store, a company, or a website collects your
private information:
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Carefully read privacy policies:
Maintain anti-malware applications on your
mobile device:
Reveal personal information on the Internet or
filling out paper forms:
Falsifying (lying) information about yourself on
a website or paper forms:
Revealing personal information if it will allow
the provider to give you better service or price:
Find out how a company or organization plans to
use your identities or private information:
Have multiple email accounts to protect privacy:
Download security patches for your personal
computer:
Check credit card billing statements:
Pay not to list your name in phone directories:

Appendix B: Post-survey Text

1. Which wireless security projects do you like
most? (Please check all that apply)

1. What is your age?

A.

13-17

B.

18-25

C.

26-30

D.

A.

Blue Fishing

B.

Bluetooth OBEX File Transfer Attack
(Bluejacking)

30-35

C.

WPS Vulnerability

E.

36-45

D.

Session Hijacking

F.

46-55

E.

ARP Spoofing

G.

56-65

H.

65+

2. Compared to projects in other courses, what
features do you like most? (Please check all that
apply)

2. What is your gender?

A.

Male

B.

Female

3. What is your ethnicity?

A.

African American or African heritage

B.

Asian American or Asian heritage

C.

Caucasian American or European heritage

D.

Hispanic American or Hispanic heritage

E.

Other (please specify)

High School

B.

Undergraduate

C.

Graduate

Video and live demo

B.

Sample projects (including executable files)

C.

Projects descriptions and instructions

D.

Background information

E.

Available on a website

F.

Other:

3. Whom will you educate on the wireless security
that you have learned? (Please check all that apply)

4. Current Education Level

A.

A.

A.

Family members (parents, siblings, children,
etc.)

B.

Friends

C.

Coworkers

D.

Others:

4. What additional information do you wish to have
for the projects?
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H.

5. Do you have any suggestions to improve the PSP
website?

I don’t know

5. What types of activities are you comfortable
performing on your device using publically
accessible Wi-Fi networks? (Please check all that
apply)

1. What is Bluetooth Discoverable mode?

A. It enables other Bluetooth devices to connect to
the device.
B. It allows other cell phones to view files on the
device.
C. It advertises services and connection details on a
Bluetooth-enabled device.
D. It allows a Bluetooth device to query for other
Bluetooth devices.

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

Surf the Internet
Check email
Access financial or shopping apps
Listen to streaming radio
Watch movies or TV shows
Play multi-player games
I not comfortable accessing public Wi-Fi
networks

2. How do you secure your Bluetooth devices?

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

1. Pervasive Security and Privacy (PSP) Website and
projects

Use the default setting
Turn Bluetooth off
Enable Bluetooth encryption operations
Use Bluetooth device pairing
None of these
I don’t know

1. ) Strongly agree
2. ) Agree
3. ) Don’t know

3. What is meant by the term “unsecured wireless
network”?

4. ) Disagree

A.




B.
C.
D.

5. ) Strongly disagree

Communication on the network is
unencrypted.
The network is known to have viruses.
No password is required to connect to the
network.
Users on the network can view files on one
another’s computers.






4. To secure your Wi-Fi networks, which wireless
security protocol do you choose? (Please check all
that apply. )

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

I like the wireless security projects
I will recommend the website and projects to
others
The projects help me to secure my mobile
devices
The projects help me to securely use the Internet
The projects help me to securely use Wi-Fi
networks
The projects help me to securely use Bluetooth

2. How likely are you to connect your device(s) to
publically accessible Wi-Fi networks in the following
locations?

WEP
VPN
WPA/WPA2
SES
Others
Use push button technology
None of these

1. ) Completely Unlikely
2. ) Somewhat Unlikely
3. ) Somewhat Likely
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4. ) Very Likely

2. ) Somewhat Unlikely

5. ) Extremely Likely

3. ) Somewhat Likely
4. ) Very Likely









5. ) Extremely Likely

Airport:
Fast food Restaurant (Burger King, Panera, etc.):
Public Library:
School (university, high school):
Coffee shop (Starbucks, Joe Mugs, etc.):
Bookstore (Barnes and Noble, Books a Million,
etc.):
Religious organization (Church, synagogue,
mosque, etc.):








8. How likely are you to take the following actions
concerning your mobile device(s)?




1. ) Completely Unlikely
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Disable Wi-Fi on your phone when not in a
trusted area:
Use “Just Works” setup for Bluetooth devices
Only use manual setup for Bluetooth devices
Pair with an unknown Bluetooth device that
requests access:
Swap to my data provider network when in
public places:
Disable Bluetooth on your mobile device when
not using Bluetooth connectivity:
Set a passcode on your mobile device:
Configure your mobile device to autolock after a
period of inactivity:
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